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NOTES
THE VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT OF 1982:
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION FOR CONTINUING
CRIMES
INTRODUCTION
In response to the needs of victims of federal crimes, the 97th Congress
enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 ("VWPA").1
The VWPA authorizes a federal court to award restitution as part of a
defendant's sentence2 but, by its terms, applies only to offenses occurring
on or after January 1, 1983, the effective date of the statute.3
Federal courts are divided over whether the statute permits restitution
for losses sustained by victims of continuing crimes when such losses oc-
curred before the effective date. The Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits
look to the language of the effective date and allow restitution only for
losses occurring on or after January 1, 1983.' Under this approach, vic-
tims may still recover pre-effective date losses in subsequent civil pro-
ceedings.5 The Second, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, however,
grant restitution for losses occurring before and after the effective date of
the VWPA when the offense is a continuing crime or scheme to defraud.6
1. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 18 U.S.C. and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2)).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (Supp. V 1987) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3579(a)(1)). "The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense under
this title ... may order, in addition to or, in the case of a misdemeanor, in lieu of any
other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of
such offense." Id.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (a)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 896 (5th Cir. 1988) ("When the
defendant's offense is a unitary conspiracy or scheme to defraud, the government must
identify which losses resulted from acts committed before and which from acts commit-
ted after the effective date for the purposes of restitution. .. ."); United States v. Oldaker,
823 F.2d 778, 781 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Although conspiracy is commonly viewed as an
ongoing offense, the losses suffered by Oldaker's victims after January 1, 1983, are the
only ones compensable under the Act."); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 184, 189 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("[W]hile a scheme to defraud ... may properly be viewed as one unitary
offense, the losses which resulted therefrom must be separately identified as those which
occurred before and those which occurred after January 1, 1983 . . ").
5. See Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 931, 940 n.71 (1984); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3663(e) (Supp. V 1987) (originally
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2)) ("Any amount paid to a victim under an order of
restitution shall be set off against any amount later recovered as compensatory damages
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d 30, 42 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[A]ny
loss sustained as a result of one of the predicate acts underlying the RICO offenses seems
to us to fall within the scope of the Act."); United States v. Angelica, 859 F.2d 1390, 1393
(9th Cir. 1988) ("Because the fraudulent scheme continued beyond January 1, 1983, we
hold that all of the victims' losses are subject to a judgment of restitution under the
VWPA."); United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1987) ("The district
court correctly held that [defendant] pled guilty to the offense of mail fraud involving a
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These circuits focus on the unified nature of continuing offenses and re-
gard such criminal acts as having been committed after the effective date
of the VWPA.7
This Note discusses whether the VWPA should provide restitution for
losses occurring before the effective date of the statute if those losses were
sustained as a result of a continuing crime. Part I examines the legisla-
tive history of the VWPA and the policies served by restitutionary reme-
dies. Part II discusses the nature of continuing crimes and the problems
in applying the effective date of the VWPA to such crimes. Part II ar-
gues that where continuing crimes are concerned, going beyond the effec-
tive date of the VWPA is essential in order to fulfill the purpose of the
statute. Part III addresses the ex post facto clause and the constitutional-
ity of demanding restitution for losses incurred before the VWPA's effec-
tive date. This Note concludes that the VWPA should permit restitution
for pre-effective date losses when such losses are suffered as part of a
continuing crime.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND THE POLICY OF RESTITUTION
A. Legislative History
Addressing the judiciary's mistreatment of crime victims,' President
Reagan said in 1982 that, "The plight of innocent citizens victimized by
lawlessness deserves immediate national attention." 9 The President
urged "all ... involved in the criminal justice system to devote special
attention to the needs of victims of crime, and to redouble their efforts to
make our system responsive to those needs."'
10
Sharing the President's views, the Special Senate Subcommittee on Ag-
scheme which continued in operation after January 1, 1983, and therefore, was subject to
the restitution provisions of the Act."); United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571
(11 th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he conspirators continued to defend and promote their fraudulent
scheme after January 1, 1983 .... Therefore, the restitution order imposed... is author-
ized.") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935 (1987).
7. See Bortnovsky, 879 F.2d at 42; Angelica, 859 F.2d at 1393; Purther, 823 F.2d at
968; Barnette, 800 F.2d at 1571.
8. For discussion of the judiciary's mistreatment of crime victims, see R. Elias, Vic-
tims of the System: Crime Victims and Compensation in American Politics and Criminal
Justice (1983). See generally Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Pros-
ecution, 52 Miss. L.J. 515, 518-20 (1982) ("alienation of the victim"); Kiesel, Crime and
Punishment: Victim Rights Movement Presses Courts, Legislature, 70 A.B.A. J. 25 (1984)
(whether nation's system of justice has failed in meeting the needs of victims); Metz, The
Illusion of Victim Rights, Stud. Law., Mar. 1989, at 17 ("[tjhe problem is not whether
you're rich or poor, . . . but essentially: Is there any system there for anybody?"); Victims
of Crime: Giving Them Their Day in Court, Judges' J., Spring 1984 (special issue discuss-
ing rights and needs of victims); Blackmore, Paying the Price of Crime, Police Mag., July
1979, at 54 (inefficiency of judiciary and lack of response to witness needs).
9. Proclamation No. 4929, 47 Fed. Reg. 16,313 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News A47.
10. Id. The President further declared the week beginning April 19, 1982 as "Crime
Victims' Week." See id.
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ing and the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Law1" con-
ducted hearings on victims' rights. 2 These hearings indicated that
victims were the "forgotten persons"' 3 in the criminal justice system and
that their needs were being ignored.' 4
Soon after these hearings, and in response to the national outcry con-
cerning victims' rights,'5 separate bills were introduced in the Senate and
House which eventually became the VWPA.1 6 The VWPA passed both
houses with exceptional speed' 7 and support, and created a panoply of
devices that increase protection of both victims and witnesses. The
VWPA has three major provisions. First, the VWPA amends the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure to require that a pre-sentencing report
assessing the financial, social, psychological and medical impact of the
crime upon the victim be filed with the trial judge.1 " Second, Section
1512 of Title 18 broadens the definition of witness to include victims and
expands witness protection to cases other than organized crime of-
fenses. 19 Section 1512 also provides criminal penalties for intimidation of
victims and witnesses2" and lowers the threshold requirements for com-
11. See S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 2515, 2536 [hereinafter Senate Report on Criminal Law].
12. See Hearings Before the Special Committee on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. S141-
43 (1982) (testimony of witnesses appearing before the Committee on the Effects of Crime
on the Elderly); Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Concerning the Omni-
bus Victims Protection Act, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. S521-81 (1982) (testimony about mis-
treatment of crime victims by judicial system).
13. See Senate Report on Criminal Law, supra note 11, at 2516.
14. See id.
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. Senator Thurmond of South Carolina began the process on September 17, 1981,
with the introduction of the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981. See S. 1630, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess., 127 Cong. Rec. 20,925 (1981). On April 22, 1982, this bill was com-
bined with the Omnibus Victims Protection Act. See S. 2420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
Cong. Rec. 7423 (1982).
For the House, two bills were introduced by Representative Rodino of New Jersey:
The Victims of Crime Compensation Act of 1982, H.R. 6447, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128
Cong. Rec. 11,051 (1982), and The Victim and Witness Protection and Assistance Act of
1982, H.R. 6448, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 Cong. Rec. 11,051 (1982).
17. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported on its version of the Bill, S. 2420, on
August 19, 1982. See S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1982 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2515. The Senate considered and passed S. 2420 twenty six
days later, on September 14, 1982. See 128 Cong. Rec. 23,391 (1982). On September 30,
1982, the House passed H.R. 7191, its version of the Bill, and passed the Senate Bill,
S.2420, with amendments. See 128 Cong. Rec. 26,348-63 (1982). On October 1, 1982,
the Senate passed the House version, with amendments of its own. See 128 Cong. Rec.
26,809 (1982). The House then approved the final version from the Senate on October 1,
1982. See 128 Cong. Rec. 27,386 (1982). President Reagan signed the Act into law on
October 12, 1982, less than two months after it left committee in the Senate.
18. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(2). The "Victim Impact Statement" is prepared by the
Probation Department; see also Senate Report on Criminal Law, supra note 11, at 2517-
20 (testimony of probation department that a victim impact statement be prepared).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
20. See id.
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mission of an intimidation offense.2' Third, Section 3663 of Title 18 au-
thorizes restitution for crime victims,22 but does so only when its
imposition will not unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing
process.23
Congress intended the restitution provision, Section 3663, to "ensure
that the Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of
available resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime. ."."I The
Senate report accompanying the Act called the "insensitivity and lack of
concern for the victim and witness ... a tragic failing in our criminal
justice system ' 25 and asserted that federal courts were following the
trend of state courts by "reducing restitution from being an inevitable if
not exclusive sanction to being an occasional afterthought."26 Conse-
quently, by enacting Section 3663, the Senate ensured that "the wrong-
doer [would be] required to the degree possible to restore the victim to
his or her prior state of well-being."27
By providing restitution as part of a defendant's sentence, the VWPA
fills what the Ninth Circuit felt was a sentencing gap in the Uniform
Probation Act,28 the predecessor of the VWPA. The Uniform Probation
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a),(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (Supp. V 1987) (originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3579).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d) (Supp. V 1987).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 note (b)(2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The Act, according to Sena-
tor Heinz, was "a constructive federal approach designed to rebalance the scales ofjustice
in favor of the valid interest of the victim." See 128 Cong. Rec. 26,809 (1982).
Senator Heinz commented that "it is, unfortunately, not too strong a statement to
make that most crime victims are victimized twice-the second time by the insensitivity
of a criminal justice system which fails to acknowledge that people, too, are victims. This
bill takes a long step forward in preventing that second crime." See 128 Cong. Rec.
26,810 (1982); see also 128 Cong. Rec. 27,392 (1982) (statement by Representative Fish)
("It is time for this Congress to show the compassion to victims of Federal crime that
they deserve and have a right to expect").
25. Senate Report on Criminal Law, supra note 11, at 2516.
26. Id. at 2536. The Senate sought to implement "new methods of constructive, vic-
tim-oriented sentencing practices [that] can insure... that the prosecutorial, judicial and
probation authorities know, and are encouraged to respond to, the victim's monetary
damages." Id. at 2537.
27. Id. at 2536. Senator Laxalt stated that "[i]t is the intent of Congress that judges
order restitution in each and every case where the court finds there has been property loss
or injury to the victim. The purpose of this bill is to attempt to make the victim whole
once again." 128 Cong. Rec. 26,811 (1982).
28. See United States v. Signori, 844 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). The Uniform
Probation Act provided, in pertinent part, that the court,
[u]pon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death
or life imprisonment, ... may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence
and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems best.
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant ...
[m]ay be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for ac-
tual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had ....
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed Nov. 1, 1987).
In addition to filling the sentencing gap, Congress expanded the term "offense" under
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Act awarded restitution only as a condition of probation.2 9 The VWPA,
in contrast, allows restitution in conjunction with imprisonment or fine.3"
B. Policy of Restitution
The two primary goals of restitution are to prevent unjust enrich-
ment31 and to promote rehabilitation. 32 Traditional notions of justice
provide that a defendant who profits from wrongdoing "in equity and
good conscience... should not be permitted to retain that by which [he]
has been enriched. ' 33 Furthermore, by forcing the defendant to disgorge
his ill-gotten gains, restitution fosters societal confidence in the fairness
of the legal system.3" Restitution also forces a defendant to assume finan-
cial responsibility for his unlawful actions35 and impresses upon the
Section 3663 of the VWPA. The Uniform Probation Act provided that a defendant
"[m]ay be required to make restitution... to aggrieved parties for.., loss caused by the
offense for which conviction was had. . . ." 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1986) (repealed Nov. 1,
1987). The VWPA does not contain this limiting language and provides that a court may
order "the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense". 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a) (Supp. V 1987). This liberalization of "offense" is some indication of intent by
Congress to expand the reaches of Section 3663 beyond those for which a conviction was
had. See Project, Congress Opens a Pandora's Box-The Restitution Provisions of the Vic-
tim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 507, 509-17 (1984).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (repealed Nov. 1, 1987).
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1)(A),(B) (Supp. V 1987). The federal courts were au-
thorized "for the first time, to order payment of restitution independently of a sentence of
probation." S. Rep. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2515, 2536.
31. See Restatement of the Law of Restitution § 1 (1937).
32. See B. Galaway, Toward the Rational Development of Restitution Programming,
Restitution in Criminal Justice 77 (1977). Professor Galaway postulates five purposes for
restitution: (1) redress for victims; (2) rehabilitation for offenders; (3) reduction of the
need for vengeance by the victim; (4) less severe and more humane sanctions for offend-
ers; and, (5) reduced demand upon the criminal justice system. See id. at 82-83.
"[R]estitution is an appropriate and effective criminal sanction that promotes the crimi-
nal law's goals of rehabilitation, deterrence and retribution. Moreover, only within the
criminal justice system can restitution foster these aims." Note, Victim Restitution in the
Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 931, 941 (1984); see S. Rep.
No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2538
(VWPA allows alternative forms of restitution so that restitution can "satisfy the victim
and provide maximum rehabilitative incentives to the offender").
33. Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States Sugar Equalization Bd., Inc., 268 F.
575, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1920). One commentator argues that the deterrent value of restitu-
tion would be greater if supervised restitution were imposed in an amount which would
penalize the criminal. See K. Menninger, The Crime of Punishment 68 (1968).
34. See Lamborn, Remedies for the Victims of Crime, 43 S. Cal. L. Rev. 22 (1970);
McAdam, Emerging Issue: An Analysis of Victim Compensation in America, 8 Urban
Law. 346, 349-50 (1976). If victims are given prompt and full restitution, they have an
immediate sense that justice has been done. See Lamborn, supra, at 27. The criminal
justice system, by forcing the convicted defendant to make the victim whole, restores
trust and confidence to our judicial system. See id.
35. See Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 554 (1978); B. Galaway, supra note 32,
at 83; Note, supra note 32, at 939.
Restitution's rehabilitative effectiveness "stems from its direct relation to the amount
of damage suffered by the victim: by ordering restitution, a court forces the defendant to
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criminal that he has injured a human being.36 "Through restitution, an
offender can express guilt in a socially acceptable manner and can in-
crease his self-respect by gaining a sense of accomplishment."37
II. CONTINUING CRIMES UNDER THE ACT
A. Continuing Crimes
Continuing crimes occur over a period of time,38 often have more than
one objective,39 and are perpetrated by acts in furtherance of a general
scheme.' ° Continuing crimes, which include schemes to defraud and
conspiracies, 41 are unique because they are unitary in nature; several dis-
tinct acts, legal or illegal, are components of a single offense.42 The
VWPA expressly authorizes the sentencing court to order a defendant to
"make restitution to any victim of the offense." 41 It is the unitary nature
of continuing crimes which permits a court to impose restitution on pre-
effective date losses. As the Supreme Court said: "As the offense has not
been terminated or accomplished [the perpetrator of a continuing crime]
is still offending. And we think, consciously offending, offending as cer-
tainly, as we have said, as at the first moment of his confederation, and
consciously through every moment of its existence."'  An examination
of two specific continuing crimes, conspiracy and mail fraud, illustrates
the unique nature of all continuing crimes.
acknowledge... the harm he has caused." Note, supra note 32, at 938; see Comment,
Compensation for Victims of Crime-The Texas Approach, 34 Sw. L.L 689, 690 (1980).
36. When the criminal is forced to compensate the victim, this enforces the idea that
his incarceration is not a punishment by and for the state, but is a result of his injuring
the victim. See Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of its Past History and an Analysis
of its Present Usefulness, 5 U. Rich. L. Rev. 71, 80 (1970).
37. Note, supra note 32, at 938. Restitution provides the offender an opportunity for
a cathartic recognition of his wrongdoing and a symbolic expiation of guilt. See Eglash,
Creative Restitution: A Broader Meaning for an Old Term, 48 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
619, 622 (1958); Schafer, Restitution to Victims of Crime-An Old Correctional Aim Mod-
ernized, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 243, 249-50 (1965); see also 128 Cong. Rec. 26,348 (1982)
(statement of Rep. Rodino) ("One who successfully makes restitution should have a posi-
tive sense of having earned a fresh start and will have tangible evidence of his or her
capacity to alter old behavior patterns and lead a law-abiding life.") (citing Huggett v.
State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403, 407 (Wis. 1978).
38. See infra notes 54-56.
39. See United States v. Walker, 653 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 908 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Inryco, Inc., 642 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir.
1981) (conspiracy to violate Sherman Act included subsidiary objective of recovering a
subcontract award), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1167 (1982).
40. See infra note 53.
41. See W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 699 (1985).
42. See Phillips v. United States, 679 F.2d 192, 196 (9th Cir. 1982).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
44. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912) ("The conspiracy accomplished
or having a distinct period of accomplishment is different from one that is to be
continuous.").
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1. Conspiracies
A conspiracy has been defined as "a combination between two or more
persons to accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by
criminal or unlawful means."45 Conspiracy is an offense distinct from
the object of the conspiracy.46 Under the no-merger rule, conspiracy is
prosecuted as a crime separate from any substantive offenses committed
in the course of the conspiracy.' Federal statutes provide criminal lia-
bility for each member of the conspiracy" in actions brought within a
five-year statute of limitations.4 9 The statute of limitations begins to run
immediately after the completion of the last overt act in furtherance of
45. R. Perkins & R. Boyce, Criminal Law 681 (1982) (citing Pettibone v. United
States, 148 U.S. 197, 203 (1893)); see Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628, 632 (10th
Cir. 1938) ("two or more persons combining with the intent and purpose of committing a
public offense by doing an unlawful act or doing a lawful act in an unlawful manner").
Several elements make up a common law conspiracy. These elements are often
changed by statutory definition. First, there must be an agreement. See Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 447-48 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). The agreement,
however, need not be formalized. See United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971). Sec-
ond, either the ends or the means must be illegal. See R. Perkins & R. Boyce, supra, at
684. It is not the agreement which is illegal, but the result of the agreement. See United
States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910). Third, while at common law a mere agreement
between parties was enough to constitute a conspiracy, see R. Perkins & R. Boyce, supra,
at 684, statutes now commonly require an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. See
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982). Acts sufficient to satisfy this third element include, for example,
taking a position to observe the activities of the intended victim of a kidnapping planned
for the future, see People v. Stevens, 78 Cal. App. 395, 396, 248 P. 696, 697 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1926), or purchasing the necessary stamps to be used in a conspiracy to commit
murder by mail. See People v. Corica, 55 Cal. App. 2d 130, 134, 130 P.2d 164, 167 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1942). One court held that a meeting to discuss plans was not an overt act
in addition to the agreement because it was a part of the agreement itself. See People v.
Hines, 168 Misc. 453, 457, 6 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
46. See Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1938); see also
United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 603-04 (1910).
47. See Troutman, 100 F.2d at 632. This doctrine is known as the "No Merger
Rule." See Johl v. United States, 370 F.2d 174, 177 (9th Cir. 1966). The "Pinkerton
Rule", articulated by the Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640
(1946), further broadened the net of conspiracy by concluding that, when a conspiracy
and a substantive offense are charged, a conspirator can be held guilty of the substantive
offense even though he did no more than join the conspiracy. See id. at 647.
48. The general federal conspiracy statute provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any [Title 18] offense against
the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any
manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect
the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or im-
prisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspir-
acy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not ex-
ceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
Conspiracy is one of the most commonly charged offenses in federal prosecutions. See
Selz, Conspiracy Law in Theory and in Practice: Federal Conspiracy Prosecutions in Chi-
cago, 5 Am. J. Crim. L. 35, 48-49 (1977).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1982).
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the conspiracy.50
Conspiracies begin when an agreement has been formed and one or
more overt acts have been performed in furtherance of the unlawful de-
sign51 and continue as long as the conspirators act to further the ends of
the agreement.5 1 If the conspirators agree to further their primary pur-
pose by taking additional steps, such as dividing profits,53 the conspiracy
will continue until those additional acts are accomplished or aban-
doned. 4 Conspiracies end when their goals are accomplished or the con-
spiracy has been abandoned.5
2. Mail Fraud
Mail fraud, like conspiracy, is a continuing crime.56 The federal mail
fraud statute provides that anyone who devises a scheme to defraud and
uses the mails in furtherance of that scheme can be held criminally lia-
ble 7.5  The essential elements of mail fraud are the act of having devised
50. See W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 41, at 699.
51. See Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1938).
52. See United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
928 (1966); see also United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910) ("mere continuance
of the result of a crime does not continue the crime").
53. See United States v. Walker, 653 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 908 (1982); Atkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1962); Koury v.
United States, 217 F.2d 387, 388 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam); see also United States v.
CFW Construction Co., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 197, 206 (D.S.C.) (where agreement includes a
payoff, conspiracy continues until payoff received), aff'd, 749 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1984).
54. See United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 141 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
928 (1966); United States v. Allegretti, 340 F.2d 254, 256 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 911 (1965); McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 133 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 301 U.S. 697 (1937).
Conspiracies, however, are not continued by express or implied agreements among
their members to keep the conspiracy secret. See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391, 399-400 (1957) (quoting Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949));
Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946). If conspiracies were continued by
implied agreements to keep them secret, the statute of limitations on a conspiracy would
effectively be tolled. All conspiracies include an implied agreement to remain silent. See
Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 404-06.
55. See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910).
56. See United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1987); see also United
States v. Cohen, 516 F.2d 1358, 1364 (8th Cir. 1975) ("proof of mail fraud scheme involv-
ing two or more persons is analogous to the nature of proof in a conspiracy").
57. The mail fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised ... any scheme or artifice to defraud, [and] ... for
the purpose of executing such scheme ... places in any post office . . . any
matter or thing ... to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, . . . shall be
fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
The federal mail fraud statute has been applied to a broad range of offenses. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 979 (7th Cir. 1987) (bribery); United States v. Washita
Construction Co., 789 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1986) (bid rigging); United States v. Girdner,
754 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1985) (election fraud).
The Supreme Court, in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), greatly re-
stricted the applicability of the federal mail fraud statute by holding that it could not be
used to prosecute those who fraudulently deprive others of "intangible rights" such as the
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or intended to devise a scheme to defraud, 8 and the act of placing or
causing mail to be placed in an authorized depository with the intent to
carry out an essential step in the execution of the scheme to defraud. 9
A mailing must be sufficiently related to the scheme to defraud to con-
stitute mail fraud.6 ° For example, letters used to lure victims into the
scheme are closely related to the scheme and are covered by the statute.61
A mailing which is not sufficiently related to the scheme, such as mailing
stolen credit card receipts,62 or which occurs after the scheme has
reached fruition,63 does not fall within the purview of the mail fraud
statute.
Although each use of the mails may constitute a separate instance of
mail fraud," when the mailings are part of a larger mail fraud scheme,
all of them must be prosecuted as one unified scheme to defraud.65 Con-
sequently, each mailing is simply a count within the indictment.66
B. The VWPA and Continuing Crimes
A strict interpretation of the VWPA, adopted by the Fifth, Fourth and
Third Circuits, precludes restitution for losses from a continuing crime
right to an honest government. See id. at 366-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court so
held even though mail fraud was often the "sole instrument of justice that could be
wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners of deceit." Note, McNally v. United
States and its Effect on the Federal Mail Fraud Statute: Will White Collar Criminals Get
a Break?, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 697, 697 (1988) (quoting Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud
Statute I, 18 Duq. L. Rev. 771, 772 (1980)).
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
59. See id.
60. See United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 799 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
829 (1975).
61. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 403 (1974). "Lulling letters" include
not only those which entice the victim into the scheme, but also those which lull a victim
into a false sense of security or postpone the victims' ultimate complaint. See Ashdown,
509 F.2d at 799-800.
62. See Maze, 414 U.S. at 402. The defendant was engaged in a stolen credit card
scheme. When a merchant mails receipts from stolen credit cards to the collecting bank,
he is not perpetuating the scheme.
63. See Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88, 94 (1944). The scheme, purchasing goods
or services with fraudulent checks, reached fruition when the defendant received the
goods or services. The bank's use of the mails in the ordinary course of business to effec-
tuate collection of the check was not in furtherance of the scheme.
64. See Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621, 626 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 976 (1970).
65. See United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 82, 88 (3d Cir. 1985).
The offense [of mail fraud] is a scheme to defraud, and each count is simply an
act in furtherance of the unitary scheme; therefore, establishing that a single
count caused a specific loss would be difficult. It is the overall scheme that is
central to all the counts and gives rise to the victims' financial loss.
Id.
66. See United States v. Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
998 (1980); United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978); Hanrahan
v. United States, 348 F.2d 363, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 845 (1967).
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which occurred prior to January 1, 1983.67 This interpretation, however,
creates procedural difficulties. In the case of continuing crimes, it may
be very difficult to distinguish between losses taking place before and af-
ter the effective date." This confusion can have the effect of complicat-
ing and prolonging the sentencing process.69 If substantial, the
complication might bar the granting of restitution.7" In addition, this
strict interpretation ignores the VWPA's mandate to provide compensa-
tion to victims of offenses" and furthers neither the purpose of the
VWPA nor the policy of restitution.72 Rather than follow this literal
approach, courts should construe the effective date of the VWPA to per-
mit pre-effective date restitution.
1. Statute of Limitations Analysis
A statute of limitations has the procedural effect of barring prosecu-
tion for an offense if the action is not brought within a requisite time
period.7 3 Limiting exposure to criminal prosecution relieves individuals
of the burden of defending themselves against charges when the relevant
facts have been obscured by the passage of time.74 All statutes of limita-
tions provide that the period of limitations begins to run when every ele-
ment in the statutory definition of an offense has been committed.75 For
continuing crimes, the statute of limitations begins to run when the
course of conduct or defendant's complicity terminates.76
A statute of limitations also has an evidentiary effect when applied to
continuing crimes.77 Despite the time-bar to prosecution, acts occurring
outside the statute of limitations may be introduced into evidence when
67. See supra note 4, 5 and accompanying text.
68. See United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1987).
69. Two circuit courts have found that the severance of a mail fraud or conspiracy
into pre- and post-effective date loss is at best impractical and would certainly complicate
the sentencing process. See United States v. Purther, 823 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Woods, 775 F.2d 82, 88 (3d Cir. 1985). For example, in Purther, a mail
fraud case, the court stated that "[iut would be virtually impossible to determine precisely
when each victim of a scheme ... actually suffered his or her loss. This is especially so
where ... the perpetrator makes some payments of 'interest' or 'return on investment'
." Purther, 823 F.2d at 968.
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d) (Supp. V 1987).
71. The term "offense" has caused some interpretational problems. One commenta-
tor discussed the problems courts were having in applying both a broad and narrow inter-
pretation of offense. See Project, supra note 28, at 509-17.
72. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
73. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970).
74. See id. at 114.
75. See W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 41, § 18.5(a), at 699.
76. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 368-69 (1912) (defendant convicted of
conspiracy); United States v. A-A-A Electrical Co., 788 F.2d 242, 245 (4th Cir. 1986)
(defendant convicted of conspiracy in restraint of trade); United States v. Girard, 744
F.2d 1170, 1172 (5th Cir. 1984) (dismissal of indictment for bid rigging based on expira-
tion of statute of limitations).
77. See United States v. Brasco, 516 F.2d 816, 818 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
860 (1975).
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they are part of a continuing crime.7"
Criminal acts occurring within the statute of limitations are subject to
prosecution under the no-merger rule. In contrast, evidence of criminal
acts occurring outside the statute of limitations can be admitted only as
evidence of the continuing nature of a continuing crime, but cannot be
introduced to support substantive prosecution of the criminal act. 79
Thus, crimes which cannot be the focus of an indictment can neverthe-
less be used as evidence to demonstrate the nature of the scheme and the
intent required to prove a continuing crime.8" Courts admit proof of
events occurring outside the statute of limitations because "[lt would be
a bizarre result indeed if a [continuing] crime properly prosecuted within
the limitations period could not be proven because an essential element
... could only be established by proof of incidents occurring outside the
period."8 "
The effective date provision of the VWPA is arguably similar in opera-
tion to a statute of limitations.8 " Both create cut-off dates, points at
which prior events cannot be made the basis for the pertinent govern-
78. See United States v. Seuss, 474 F.2d 385, 391 (1st Cir.) ("pre-statute of limitations
evidence [is] admissible 'to show the nature of the scheme and the intent', but only 'if it is
connected up with the scheme existing when the overt acts were performed' ") (quoting
defendant's admission regarding pre-statute of limitations evidence) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928 (1973).
In Troutman v. United States, 100 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1938), the court stated that
"evidence tending to prove relevant acts or conduct which occurred before the date on
which it is charged the scheme was devised, or more than three years before the return of
the indictment, may be admitted if within the period of limitations the mails were used in
furtherance of such scheme." Id. at 633; see United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 365
(D.C. Cir.) (because mailings that clearly furthered scheme to defraud occurred within
five years of indictment, mail fraud prosecution is not time barred as agreement to pay
bribes falling within time-barred period), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988); United States
v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (racketeering act falling outside
of limitation period may be used as element of RICO prosecution, provided at least one
other act occurred within period); United States v. Blosser, 440 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir.
1971) ("proof running back of the statute is admissible to show the scheme and intent if it
is connected up with the scheme existing when use of the mails occurred"); Weatherby v.
United States, 150 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1945) (if any use of the mails was within
period, the prosecution was timely); Little v. United States, 73 F.2d 861, 867 (10th Cir.
1934) (no defense that scheme was formed prior to the limitations period); Fournier v.
United States, 58 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir.) (date of mailing rather than date of agreement is
germane to statute of limitations), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 565 (1932); Munch v. United
States, 24 F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1928) (usage of mails, not scheme to defraud, triggers
the statute of limitations); United States v. Epperson, 552 F. Supp. 359, 361 (S.D. Ill.
1982) (while only nine of fourteen acts comprising mail fraud were committed within
statute of limitations, court admitted remaining five acts as evidence of mail fraud
scheme).
However, it must be proven that one overt act was performed during this period and
that the overt act was performed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957).
79. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
80. See United States v. Blosser, 440 F.2d 697, 699 (10th Cir. 1971).
81. United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
829 (1975).
82. See Attorney General's Memorandum, Implementation of the Restitution Provi-
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ment action. Neither, however, should bar courts from recognizing the
unique nature of continuing crimes and treating them as unitary
crimes.a A rigid adherence to effective date requirements would subvert
the primary purpose of the underlying statute. Courts should be able to
interpret the effective date of the VWPA to provide complete restitution
to victims of continuing crimes. Similarly, in the statute of limitations
context, the government may ignore the statute of limitations for eviden-
tiary purposes despite the fundamental policies behind the statute of
limitations. 4
Given the legislative history of the VWPA and the policy underlying
all restitution, going beyond the effective date of the VWPA is no more
objectionable than "breaching" the statute of limitations for evidentiary
purposes.5 In the statute of limitations context, evidence is permitted to
sions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (1983) (on file at Fordham Law
Review). The Attorney General stated:
[T]he United States Attorney's offices should take the position that it is the
intent of the legislation to aid victims; therefore, the Act should apply to crimes
that were committed, or continued, past the effective date of the legislation pro-
visions. An analogy may be drawn to the statute of limitations; a continuing
offense that occurs in part before the statute runs may be included in the offense
charged.
Id. at 21.
83. Any restitution to the victim must comply with the defendant's due process
rights. See Project, supra note 28, at 544-67. In order to provide pre-effective date resti-
tution for continuing crimes, therefore, it may be useful for the trial court to use a special
interrogatory charge to the jury to determine which acts were included in the conviction
for the continuing crime. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984). Such special interrogative will ensure that "[a]ny dis-
pute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved by the court by the
preponderance of the evidence." 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (Supp. V 1987) (originally codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3580(d)) (emphasis added).
One could argue that if restitution cannot be imposed for acts no longer subject to
prosecution as substantive offenses because they occurred outside the statute of limita-
tion, that restitution for those acts should also be prohibited. The connection between
restitution and prosecution, however, is not so clean. For example, courts have given
restitution for acts not leading to convictions when those acts are counts in a plea- bar-
gained indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1055 (7th Cir. 1982)
("restitution of any amount up to the entire illicit gain from such a scheme, even if only
some specific incidents are the basis of the guilty plea"); United States v. Roberts, 619
F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1979) (when amount of actual damages caused by defendant and
sufficient identification of the victim to allow reparation are established, the requirements
of Section 3651 are satisfied). But see United States v. Buechler, 557 F.2d 1002, 1008 (3d
Cir. 1977) ("Because that amount exceeds the 'loss caused by the offense for which con-
viction was had,' the restitution order exceeded the authority conferred by Section 3651
and is, to that extent, illegal."); Karrell v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 987 (9th Cir.)
("the trial court erred in ordering restitution as to losses sustained by any [victim] other
than one directly concerned in the six counts upon which appellant stands convicted"),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950); United States v. Follette, 32 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D.
Pa. 1940) (judge may order restitution only "for actual damages or loss caused by the
offense for which conviction was had").
84. See Attorney General's Memorandum, supra note 82; supra notes 77-81 and ac-
companying text.
85. See Attorney General's Memorandum, supra note 82.
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prove such essential elements as intent even though that evidence may
offend the policies behind the statute of limitations.86 In contrast, going
beyond the effective date of the VWPA clearly furthers the policy behind
the VWPA."7 Going beyond the effective date of the VWPA provides
complete restitution, and thereby fulfills the purposes of the VWPA.88
"Incomplete compensation does not remedy fully the wrong commit-
ted,"89 therefore, permitting the perpetrator of a continuing crime to
avoid making restitution for pre-effective date losses is "intolerable from
a societal perspective." 90
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: Ex POST FACTO ANALYSIS
The United States Constitution forbids the federal and state govern-
ments from enacting any ex post facto law or bill of attainder.91 Ex post
facto laws retroactively criminalize past innocent acts, 92 retroactively in-
crease the punishment for crimes, 93 or retroactively alter the rules of evi-
dence to permit courts to receive less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the offense.94 The Supreme Court recognizes that
the ex post facto prohibition furthers two important purposes. First, it
ensures "that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit
individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed."95 Second,
the prohibition also "restricts governmental power by restraining arbi-
trary and potentially vindictive legislation." 96
In United States v. Corn, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant restitution
for losses incurred prior to the effective date of the VWPA, reasoning
that doing so would increase the punishment applicable to crimes and
violate the ex post facto clause. 97 This court, however, erred in its appli-
cation of ex post facto principles to continuing crimes. When criminal
conduct continues after the enactment or amendment of a statute which
increases the penalty imposed on such conduct, the statute may be ap-
plied to the part of the continuing crime occurring before its enactment
86. See United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
829 (1975).
87. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
89. Partial restitution, although it does not fully address pecuniary harm, may still
have some rehabilitative effects. See Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in Old Bottles, in
Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process 231, 257 (1977).
90. United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981). The court
stated that such incomplete restitution would not foster a defendant's acceptance of re-
sponsibility for his unlawful actions. See id.
91. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10, cl. 1.
92. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). Calder envisioned the gov-
ernment enacting a law that would criminalize an act that was previously innocent, then
applying the law to acts occurring before the law was passed. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981).
96. Id. at 29.
97. See United States v. Corn, 836 F.2d 889, 895-96 (5th Cir. 1988).
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without violating the ex post facto prohibition.9" By engaging in criminal
conduct after the effective date of a statute, the defendant voluntarily
subjects himself to the increased penalty. Simply because the increased
penalty relates to the conduct occurring prior to the effective date does
not create an ex post facto violation. Courts universally cite the unitary
nature of continuing crimes and conclude that a statute imposing a
greater penalty for a continuing crime, where the crime is still being car-
ried on after the date when the statute becomes effective, does not violate
the ex post facto provision.99
CONCLUSION
Given the policies that underlie restitution, the legislative intent of the
VWPA and the unitary nature of continuing crimes, pre-effective date
losses suffered as a result of ongoing crimes should be subject to restitu-
tion under the VWPA. It was Congress' intent to help the "forgotten
persons"'" of the criminal justice system; granting pre-effective date res-
titution would further this goal.
Douglas J Kepple
98. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1175 (4th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Ferrara, 458 F.2d 868, 874 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 931 (1972); Huff v.
United States, 192 F.2d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 946 (1952);
United States v. Shackelford, 180 F. Supp. 857, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v.
Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); cf Christianson v. United States, 226 F.2d
646, 652-53 (8th. Cir. 1955) (rule forbidding use of evidence of acts or admissions of one
conspirator, occurring before the conspiracy was formed or after termination, against
another conspirator is not violated by admitting evidence establishing an existing conspir-
acy to violate a law not yet in effect), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 994 (1956).
99. See Johnson, 537 F.2d at 1175; Ferrara, 458 F.2d at 874; Huff, 192 F.2d at 915;
Shackelford, 180 F. Supp. at 859; Ogull, 149 F. Supp. at 274.
100. See Senate Report on Criminal Law, supra note 11, at 2516.
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